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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Raymond J. Melton appeals from the order of the district court summarily 
dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Underlying Criminal Proceedings 
The record and transcripts in the underlying criminal case reflect the facts of 
Melton's crime: he threw his ten-year-old daughter onto his bed, took off her clothes 
and his boxer shorts, mounted her and attempted to anally penetrate her; and failing 
that, he ejaculated onto her buttocks and hair. (#30348 R., pp.3-4; PSI, pp.1-2, 18.) 
Melton was charged with lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor under sixteen years. 
(#30348 R., pp.13-15.) After Melton made admissions to his counsel, and consulted 
with the same, he pied guilty to the charge in exchange for the state's agreement to be 
bound by the recommendations of the presentence investigator and not file additional 
charges. (#30348 R., pp.22-23; Chg. of Plea Tr., p.9, L.11 - p.10, L.14; Sent. Tr., p.25, 
Ls.10-16.) Melton told the presentence investigator that he molested his daughter 
because he was upset that her mother, his fiancee, was having sex with another man. 
(#30348 PSI, pp.2-3.) Melton also told the presentence investigator that he had placed 
his penis against his son's buttocks when his son was five years old. (#30348 PSI, p.4.) 
At sentencing, Melton's daughter read a statement indicating Melton sexually 
molested her from age five to age ten, he had choked her mother, and that she wanted 
Melton to stay in jail and not see her again. (#30348 Tr., p.29, L.9 - p.30, L.20; #31626 
Tr., p.30, L.13 - p.31, L.24.) The district court imposed a unified life sentence with 
twenty-five years fixed. (#30348 R., pp.30-37.) Melton appealed. (#30348 R., pp.41-
1 
44.) The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Melton's sentence in an unpublished 
decision. (R., p.23.) Melton's petition for review was denied and the remittitur issued 
November 10, 2004. (R., pp.25, 27.) 
Facts And Proceedings In The Prior Post-Conviction Case 
Melton filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief on April 19, 2004. This 
petition challenged Melton's trial counsel's conduct in the underlying criminal case 
(#31626 R., pp.1-35) and asserted a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based upon the 
allegation that "the prosecutor showed unfairness by instructing petitioner's daughter on 
what exactly to say and how to say it" (#31626 R., pp.17, 33). Appointed post-
conviction counsel, Mr. Craig D. Hobney, filed an amended petition, which Melton 
signed, challenging Melton's counsel's conduct in the underlying criminal case and 
dropping the prosecutorial misconduct claim. (#31626 R., pp.36-38.) 
The district court held an· evidentiary hearing on January 4, 2005, and the 
following exchange between Melton and the prosecutor took place: 
. Q. Okay, and you were there. You heard [your daughter] say 
[at the preliminary hearing] that you had touched her on the rectum - or I 
think the quote was on her butt with your penis? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. She told the truth, didn't she? 
A. Yes, she did. 
Q. Did she lie on the stand? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How did she lie on the stand, Mr. Melton? 
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A. When she was doing her last statement in the courtroom 
when she said that she seen me choke her brother. I have never - Or 
choke her mother. I have never choked her mother or hurt her mother in 
anyway. 
Q. That was during the sentencing part? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did I tell her to lie on the stand? 
A. It was a letter that she didn't write from what I understand. 
Q. Okay, so that's when she lied. She didn't come in here and 
testify at sentencing, did she? 
A. I did not try to stick it up her butt like you guys told me. ! 
rubbed in up against her crack of her butt. I didn't put it up the part where 
she takes a shit at. Excuse my way of putting that, sir. 
Q. She didn't come into the courtroom and lie, as you 
previously have stated? 
A. Well, that I threw her on the bed, yes, that was a lie. I did 
not throw my daughter on the bed. I sat her on the bed. 
(#31626 Tr., p.95, L.11 - p.96, L.23) (emphasis added). 
On January 13, 2005, the district court made findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and denied relief on all claims. (#31626 Tr., pp.128-140; R., pp.42-57.) On appeal, the 
State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD) moved to withdraw on the ground that there 
were no non-frivolous grounds for appeal. (R., pp.29-67.) The Idaho Supreme Court 
granted the SAPD's motion to withdraw (R., p.69) and ultimately dismissed the appeal 
on February 8, 2006, after Melton failed to file an opening brief (R., pp.71, 73). The 
remittitur issued on March 22, 2006. (R., p.75.) 
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Facts And Proceedings To Date In The Instant Successive Post-Conviction Case 
On April 18, 2006, Melton filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief (R., 
pp.1-6) alleging "Ineffective Counsel - my [post-conviction] attorney Mr. Hobney failed 
to submit any evidence or lagimate [sic] argument at my evidentiary hearing" (R., p.2). 
Specifically Melton claimed that his prior post-conviction counsel "Failed to call key 
witnesses" and "Failed to present evidence ('LETTER OR AFFIDAVIT')" (R., p.3). In a 
separate document titled Memorandum of Law and Affidavit, Melton alleged his post-
conviction counsel refused to call his daughter and victim, C.M., the victim's mother 
Tammy Blevins, counselor Alisa Moon, Gooding County Sheriff's Officer Ron Gear, and 
Gooding County Prosecutor Phillip Brown as witnesses in support of allegations (1) that 
his daughter's report of molestation was a false report and (2) of prosecutorial 
misconduct based upon allegations that (a) his daughter was instructed to give 
perjurious testimony and (b) other witnesses were kept from testifying in his behalf. (R., 
pp.7-11.) In support of his successive petition claim, Melton attached two letters 
purportedly written by his daughter, only one of which had a date - October 7, 2005, 
well after the evidentiary hearing in his prior post-conviction case. (Order Granting 
Motion to Augment Record with Exhibit 5 designated "Evidence #2".) The letters 
acknowledged Melton molested her "2 or 3 times," albeit through clothing or 
underclothing and that some of her preliminary hearing testimony was true. (Order 
Granting Motion to Augment Record with Exhibit 5 designated "Evidence #2".) (Order 
Granting Motion to Augment Record with Exhibit 1 - Motion and Affidavit in Support of 
Appointment of Counsel.) 
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The state filed an answer, motion to take judicial notice, and a motion for 
summary dismissal, with a supporting brief. (R., pp.12-18, 19-21, 81-82; Order Granting 
Motion to Augment Record with Exhibit 3 - Brief in Support of Motion for Summary 
Dismissal of Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.) 
Melton filed a response to the state's motion for summary dismissal 
acknowledging that the letter purportedly from his daughter acknowledged that "some of 
what she said [in her preliminary hearing testimony] was true," but nevertheless 
reasserting his opinion that his prior post-counsel was ineffective and requesting the 
court to grant relief on his successive petition. (R., pp.83-88.) 
The district court took judicial notice of the record of the underlying criminal and 
prior post-conviction cases and granted the state's motion for summary dismissal, 
concluding Melton's claims were previously litigated, Melton admitted rubbing his penis 
"up against her crack of her butt," his daughter's supposed recantation acknowledged 
Melton molested her "2 or 3 times," and there were no substantive grounds raised to 
justify a successive petition. (R., pp.90-105.) 
Melton filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.106-109.) 
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ISSUES 
Melton states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err in failing to grant, or even rule upon, Mr. 
Melton's motion for appointment of counsel before summarily 
dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief? 
2. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Melton's 
successive petition for post-conviction relief? 
(Appellant's brief, p.16.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. In light of Melton's prior post-conviction testimony admitting he put his penis "up 
against her crack of her butt," has Melton failed to establish that the district court 
erred in summarily dismissing his untimely successive petition as barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata, failing to meet the successive petition standard, and 
failing to raise a genuine issue of material fact? 
2. In light of Melton's prior post-conviction testimony, admitting he put his penis "up 
against her crack of her butt," Melton's successive UPCPA petition failed to 
allege facts raising the possibility of a valid claim. Has Melton failed to show that 
any error in the district court's failure to address his motion for appointment of 
counsel was anything other than harmless? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Correctly Correctly Summarily Dismissed Melton's Petition Because 
His Challenge To The Truth Of His Victim's Preliminary Hearing Testimony Was Barred 
By Res Judicata And The Petition Was Successive And Untimely 
A. Introduction 
Melton concedes the district court correctly concluded that his successive petition 
alleged claims, including his prosecutorial misconduct claim, were already raised and 
decided in proceedings on his first post-conviction petition. (Appellant's brief, pp.24-25.) 
Nevertheless, Melton contends he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his previously 
litigated claim because it was allegedly inadequately raised in the prior post-conviction 
proceeding. (Appellant's brief, p.24-34.) Contrary to his contention, the district court 
correctly concluded Melton's successive post-conviction claim was barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata, the successive petition bar in I.C. § 19-4908, and the statute of 
limitation. Furthermore, if the merits could be addressed, his claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct for making the victim perjure herself is frivolous. The victim's letters confirm 
Melton molested her, a fact Melton himself admitted under oath at the evidentiary 
hearing in his prior post-conviction case when he testified he put his penis "up against 
her [the victim's] crack of her butt." (#31626 Tr., p.95, L.11 - p.96, L.23.) 
B. Melton Concedes His Successive Petition Sought To Re-litigate Previously 
Considered Post-Conviction Claims When Re-litigation Is Barred By The Doctrine 
Of Res Judicata 
Melton concedes that his successive petition sought to re-litigate previously 
considered post-conviction claims. (Appellant's brief, pp.24-25, n.19.) Therefore, the 
principles and policies of res judicata are very appropriate to the instant case. The 
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doctrine of res judicata prevents re-litigation of issues that have been previously 
decided in a final judgment or decision in an action between the same litigants. State v. 
Rhoades, 134 Idaho 862, 863, 11 P.3d 481,482 (2000); Gubler v. Brydon, 125 Idaho 
107, 110, 867 P.2d 981, 984 (1994) (resjudicata "prevents the litigation of causes of 
action which were finally decided in a previous suit"). Likewise, any claims asserted 
and finally decided in an appeal are barred by res judicata in a subsequent appeal. 
Beasley v. State, 126 Idaho 356, 363, 883 P.2d 714, 721 (Ct. App. 1994). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has provided a clear and concise recitation of the res 
judicata doctrine: 
Res Judicata is comprised of claim preclusion (true res judicata) 
and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). Under principles of claim 
preclusion, a valid final judgment rendered on the merits by a court of 
competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between 
the same parties upon the same claim. Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 
256, 668 P.2d 130, 132 (Ct. App. 1983); see Diamond v. Farmers Group, 
Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 150, 804 P.2d 319, 323 (1990) (citing from Joyce v. 
Murphy Land Co., 35 Idaho 549, 208 P. 241 (1922)). The three 
fundamental purposes served by res judicata are: 
First, it "[preserves) the acceptability of judicial dispute 
resolution against the corrosive disrespect that would follow 
if the same matter were twice litigated to inconsistent 
results." Second, it serves the public interest in protecting 
the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and 
third, it advances the private interest in repose from the 
harassment of repetitive claims. 
Aldape, 105 Idaho at 257, 668 P.2d at 133 (citation omitted). 
The doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent 
relitigation of a claim previously asserted, but also subsequent relitigation 
of any claims relating to the same cause of action which were actually 
made or which might have been made. Wing v. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912, 
915-916, 684 P.2d 314, 317-318 (Ct. App.1984) ("[T)he rule against 
splitting a claim applies even though the remedies or forms of relief 
demanded in one suit are different from those demanded in another."); 
see also U.S. Bank Nat'/ Ass'n v. Kuenzli, 134 Idaho 222, 226, 999 P.2d 
8 
877, 881 (2000) (noting Idaho has adopted the "transactional approach" to 
res judicata). Moreover, other courts have held that the doctrine applies 
even where the prior litigation was a small claims action. Williams v. 
Christiansen, 109 Idaho 393, 397-398, 707 P.2d 504, 508-509 (Ct. App. 
1985); see also Landry v. Luscher, 95 Wash.App. 779, 976 P.2d 1274, 
1278-1279 (1999), review denied, 139 Wash.2d 1006, 989 P.2d 1140 
(1999) (holding plaintiff who obtained judgment for damage to car barred 
by doctrine of claim preclusion from later maintaining action for personal 
injuries sustained in same accident). 
Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). The doctrine of res 
judicata is recognized in criminal and post-conviction cases as well. Examples include 
Kraft v. State, 100 Idaho 671,603 P.2d 1005 (1979); State v. Fetterly, 115 Idaho 231, 
766 P.2d 701 (1988); State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 766 P.2d 678 (1988); State v. 
Sivak, 119 Idaho 320, 806 P.2d 413 (1990); State v. Lankford, 127 Idaho 608, 903 P.2d 
1305 (1995); and LePage v. State, 109 Idaho 581, 710 P.2d 10 (Ct. App. 1985). Melton 
asserts his post-conviction counsel should have presented different evidence and/or 
made a different legal argument in support of the prosecutorial misconduct claim raised 
in the first petition. (R., p.2.) Re-litigation of Melton's claim, an issue upon which 
evidence was presented at the prior post-conviction evidentiary hearing (#31626 Tr., 
p.95, L.11 - p.96, L.23) and the merits of which were ruled upon by the district court in 
denying post-conviction relief (#31626 Tr., p.128-140; R., pp.42-57), is barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata. Contrary to Melton's contention (Appellant's brief pp.25-27), 
inadequate presentation of evidence or legal argument at an evidentiary hearing, i.e. a 
trial on the merits, does not provide an exception to the res judicata bar. 
Melton cites Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 441, 128 P.3d 975, 978 (Ct. App. 
2006) for the proposition that "an allegation that a claim was not adequately presented 
in the first post-conviction action due to deficiency of prior post-conviction counsel, if 
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true, provides sufficient reason to permit the claims to be presented again in a 
subsequent petition." However, Griffin is not subject to the overly broad reading Melton 
attempts tGJ give it. First, Griffin does not discuss the doctrine of res judicata, let alone 
any exceptions to it. Rather, the issue in Griffin was one of interpretation of I.C. § 19-
4908. Specifically, Griffin addressed whether prior post-conviction counsel's failure to 
respond to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss, which under the rule 
announced in Sabin v. State, 129 Idaho 257, 923 P.2d 502 (Ct. App. 1996), overruled 
by Garza v. State, 139 Idaho 533, 82 P.3d 445 (2003), resulted in the forfeiture of his 
claims, n:iight constitute "sufficient reason" for a successive petition and whether the 
district court's notice of intent to dismiss gave Griffin "adequate notice" of the deficiency 
of his factual allegations of legal theories. 142 Idaho at 441-42, 128 P.3d at 978-79. 
Additionally, Griffin is distinguished on its facts. Unlike Melton's case, where the 
merits of his prosecutorial misconduct claim were ruled upon after an evidentiary 
hearing for his first post-conviction petition, Griffin's first post-conviction claims were 
procedurally defaulted under the now repudiated Sabin automatic forfeiture rule. 
Nothing in Griffin permits a civil litigant to re-litigate a case following a trial on the merits 
merely because the litigant ·Iater claims counsel did not adequately litigate the case the 
first time. 
As a general rule, once a judgment issues res judicata applies with respect to all 
issues which were or could have been litigated. The exclusive procedures for attacking 
a civil judgment are a motion to amend the judgment, an appeal1, a motion for new trial, 
1 Regarding appeal of a civil judgment, a notice of appeal must be filed within forty-two 
days. I.C. § 13-201; I.C. § 19-4909; I.AR. 14(a) and 21. Melton appealed the judgment 
of January 13, 2005 (#31626 R., pp.58-60), however, because his appeal was frivolous, 
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or a motion for modification of the judgment. See Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328, 
333, 612 P.2d 1175, 1180 (1980). Because Melton did not employ these mechanisms, 
and the judgment against him became final, he may not re-open his case and re-litigate 
his claims. 
C. In Substance Melton's Successive UPCPA Petition Is A Motion For New Trial 
Which Is Untimely Under The Civil ~ules 
Idaho appellate courts have long held that, with respect to post-judgment 
pleadings filed by convicted defendants, substance governs over form, and a 
mislabeled pleading will be treated according to its substance. Schwartz v. State, _ 
Idaho _, _, _ P.3d _. _. Docket No. 33326, slip op. at p.5 (Ct. App. January 29, 
2008) (citing cases). Melton's successive petition requesting a new post-conviction 
evidentiary hearing on the ground that his prior post-conviction counsel did not present 
the right evidence or make the right legal argument (R., pp.2-3) is in substance a 
disguised motion for new trial. Because Melton's successive UPCPA petition sought a 
new trial, and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, which apply in post-conviction cases, 
I.C.R. 57(b), set forth the exclusive grounds and time limits for obtaining such relief, 
Melton new trial request had to comply with the civil rules. His new trial request failed to 
do so. 
A party may move the district court to amend the judgment, or for a new trial, 
within fourteen days of the entry of judgment. See I.R.C.P. 59(b) and 59(e). "Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 59 provides for the filing of a motion for a new trial within 
fourteen days. I.R.C.P. 59(b)-(e). This very limited time period encourages parties to 
his appellate counsel was permitted to withdraw (R., pp.29-67, 69) and, when Melton 
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act promptly in raising issues they wish the trial court to address with respect to a new 
trial." Fritts v. Liddle and Loeller Construction, Inc., 144 Idaho 171, 174, 158 P.3d 947, 
950 (2007) (holding that to allow a party to amend the motion for a new trial in order to 
raise new issues would "circumvent the time limitations set forth in Rule 59" and "violate 
the purpose and intent of the rule"). Because the judgment upon which Melton sought a 
new trial was entered January 13, 2005 (#31626 R., pp.42-56), Melton's request for a 
new trial contained within his successive UPCPA petition filed April 24, 2006, well 
beyond the fourteen day time limit, is untimely. Also, Rule 59(a) lists the seven 
exclusive bases for a motion for new trial in a civil case. Negligence of counsel is not a 
basis for a motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a). Thus, in addition to being untimely, 
Melton's claim that his prior post-conviction counsel's alleged negligence in not 
submitting the right evidence or legal argument was not a cognizable ground for a 
motion for new trial under Rule 59(a). 
The only other procedural mechanism for seeking a new trial is Rule 60(b). 
Where a party seeks to avoid the operation of a judgment on the basis of: 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been 
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud 
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, 
or other misconduct of an adverse party; ... (6) any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment, fraud, mistake, or other 
justifiable reason, 
I.R.C.P. 60(b) permits the court to set aside the judgment so long as the motion is filed 
within six months of the entry of judgment. However, Rule 60(b)(2) was not available to 
Melton because his request for a new trial was not based upon a claim of "newly 
failed to file an appellant's brief, his appeal was dismissed (R., pp.71, 73, 75). 
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discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to 
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b)." I.R.C.P. 60(b)(2). Additionally, Melton's request 
for a new trial was not filed within six months of the entry of the judgment he sought to 
overturn. No other grounds under Rule 60(b) were available to Melton. 
Re-litigation after an evidentiary hearing on the merits is barred by the doctrine of 
res judicata. A claim that counsel failed to adequately present a claim in an evidentiary 
hearing on a prior post-conviction does not provide an exception to the res judicata bar 
under the rules of civil procedure. Without res judicata, no civil trial would be final; 
every civil litigant could se.cond guess their counsel's performance and demand retrial 
upon retrial. 
Melton has not shown error in the summary dismissal of his successive post-
conviction petition under the doctrine of res judicata. 
D. Additionally, Because Melton Failed To Establish "Sufficient Reason" For Re~ 
Raising His Challenge To The Truth Of His Victim's Preliminary Hearing 
Testimony, His Successive Petition Is Barred By I.C. § 19-4908 
The cases interpreting I.C. § 19-4908 have only found "sufficient reason" for a 
successive post-conviction where the successive petition claim was not adjudicated in 
the prior post-conviction proceeding due to prior post-conviction counsel's conduct. 
Idaho Code § 19-4908 provides: 
All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this act must be 
raised in his original, supplemental or amended application. Any ground 
finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and 
intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or 
sentence ... may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless 
the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was 
not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or 
amended application. 
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See Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 932, 933-34, 801 P.2d 1283, 1284-85 (1990) (any 
grounds for relief not raised are permanently waived if the grounds were known or 
should have been known at the time of the first petition) (citing Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 
Idaho 591, 635 P.2d 955 (1981)); see also I.C. § 19-4901(b). An applicant must raise 
all issues and claims in the initial application or risk waiver and forfeiture under I.C. § 
19-4908. Parsons v. State, 113 Idaho 421, 426, 745 P.2d 300, 305 (Ct. App. 1987). 
Where a second petition for post-conviction relief is filed, it must provide 
sufficient reason as to why the grounds asserted for relief were not raised in the first 
application or risk dismissal under I.C. § 19-4908. King v. State, 114 Idaho 442,446, 
757 P.2d 705, 709 (Ct. App. 1988). The Idaho Supreme Court explained what 
constitutes "sufficient reason" in Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 635 P.2d 955 (1981 ). 
In Palmer, the petitioner filed a successive post-conviction petition, raising claims that 
he failed to litigate during his. first post-conviction case. 102 Idaho at 595, 635 P .2d at 
959. Palmer asserted that these claims, which were presented in his original pro se 
petition, were omitted from the amended petition filed by court-appointed counsel 
without Palmer's knowledge or consent. lit at 595-96, 635 P.2d at 959-60. The Idaho 
Supreme Court held that these circumstances would constitute a sufficient reason for 
allowing Palmer to reassert the claims in a successive petition, because any waiver of 
the claims was not "an active, knowing choice made by Palmer." lit at 596, 635 P.2d at 
960. 
In Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494, 887 P.2d 39 (Ct. App. 1994), the Idaho Court 
of Appeals concluded that Palmer is limited to the circumstances of that case. 126 
Idaho 494, 887 P.2d 39 (Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting Nguyen's claim that Palmer entitled 
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him to a hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of his first post-conviction counsel 
because Nguyen's ineffective assistance claim, unlike Palmer's, was not based on an 
assertion that counsel omitted claims from an amended application). Likewise, Palmer 
does not permit re-litigation of claims already litigated. 
In Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 992 P.2d 789 (Ct. App. 1999), Hernandez 
argued that his post-conviction attorney's failure to respond to a notice of intent to 
dismiss, which resulted in waiver of his claims under the procedural default rule set forth 
in Sabin v. State, 129 Idaho 257, 258, 923 P.2d 502, 503 (Ct. App. 1996), overruled by 
Garza v. State, 139 Idaho 533, 82 P.3d 445 (2003) constituted "sufficient reason" to file 
a successive petition. Hernandez, 133 Idaho at 796, 992 P.2d at 791 (citing Hernandez 
v. State, Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 22818 (March 13, 1997) (unpublished)). 
Hernandez's successive application was dismissed as untimely. lg_,_ On appeal, the 
sole issue before the court was whether Hernandez's second application was timely on 
the theory that it "related back" to the date the first application was filed. lg_,_ at 798, 992 
P.2d at 793. The court concluded: 
[W]hen a second or successive application is summarily dismissed 
because of the alleged ineffectiveness of the initial post-conviction 
counsel, application of the relation-back doctrine may be appropriate. 
This is so because failing to provide a post-conviction applicant with a 
meaningful opportunity to have his or her claims presented may be 
violative of due process. 
. . . . [W]e conclude that one year is a reasonable time for an inmate in 
these circumstances to proceed with a successive post-conviction relief 
action if the initial action was dismissed due to ineffective assistance from 
the attorney representing the inmate in that proceeding. 
lg_,_ at 799, 992 P.2d at 794 (emphasis added). 
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The only question before the court in Hernandez was whether Hernandez's 
second application was time-barred, and the court concluded that delay of less than 
one-year from the determination of the appeal on Hernandez's prior post-conviction 
case was not unreasonable.2 133 Idaho at 799, 992 P.2d at 794. Because 
Hernandez's successive post-conviction case was remanded to the district court to 
consider whether his claim that due to prior post-conviction counsel's conduct his initial 
petition claims were forfeited, the court of appeals did not address whether his 
allegation of ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel constituted a 
"sufficient reason" under I.C. § 19-4908 for filing a successive petition.3 Likewise, in 
Griffin, 142 Idaho at 441-42, 128 P.3d at 978-79, the court of appeals remanded the 
case to the district court to determine whether prior post-conviction counsel's failure to 
respond to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss, which resulted in the forfeiture 
of his claims, might constitute "sufficient reason" for a successive petition and whether 
the district court's notice of intent to dismiss gave Griffin "adequate notice" of the 
deficiency of his factual allegations or legal theories. 
2 The Idaho Supreme Court, in Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 174 P.3d 870 
(2007), has concluded that a delay of thirteen months in bringing a Brady claim was 
unreasonable. 
3 As a matter of law, ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel is not an independent 
ground for a subsequent post-conviction proceeding. Lee v. State, 122 Idaho 196, 198, 
832 P.2d 1131, 1133 (1992); see also Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551,555 (1987) 
("the right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further"). 
Post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature. Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 534, 716 
P.2d 1306 (1986). The constitutional right to counsel applies only in criminal actions. 
Idaho Const. art. 1, § 13; U.S. Const. amend. VI; see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 
722, 752 (1991) ("[t]here is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction 
proceedings. Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective 
assistance of counsel in such proceedings.") 
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Thus, there are only two instances in which ineffective assistance of prior post-
conviction counsel might constitute "sufficient reason" for permitting the petitioner to file 
a claim in a successive petition: (1) where a claim raised in the original prose petition 
was omitted from the amended petition filed by court-appointed counsel without the 
petitioner's knowledge or consent, Palmer, 102 Idaho at 595-96, 635 P.2d at 959-60, or 
(2) where the petitioner's unadjudicated claim was lost or forfeited due to counsel's 
failure to respond to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss as in Hernandez and 
Griffin, a circumstance that cannot recur after the demise of the Sabin rule. Hernandez 
and Griffin do not state anything more than the Idaho Supreme Court held in Palmer v. 
Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 596, 635 P.2d 955, 960 (1981): that unadjudicated claims 
dropped from the petition or forfeited without the petitioner's knowledge or consent may 
constitute a sufficient reason for allowing the petitioner to reassert the claims in a 
successive petition. 
No case interpreting I.C. § 19-4908 has permitted a petitioner to have a new 
post-conviction evidentiary hearing based upon a claim that the attorney failed to 
present enough evidence at the first post-conviction evidentiary hearing. If such were 
the case, there would be no end to the collateral attacks a petitioner could mount. 
Every petitioner would second guess their counsel's performance and demand another 
evidentiary hearing, even if the result of the first hearing were affirmed on appeal. No 
post-conviction evidentiary hearing result would ever be final. 
Melton failed to show "sufficient reason" for proceeding on the merits of his 
successive petition claim. 
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E. Melton's April 18, 2006, Successive Petition Is Untimely Under The One Year 
Statute Of Limitation Which Expired November 10, 2005, One Year After The 
Remittitur Issued In His Direct Appeal 
The proper use of Idaho's Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA) 
avoids repetitious and successive applications, eliminates confusion, and yet protects 
the petitioner's constitutional rights. Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 456, 808 P.2d 373, 
375 (1991). The UPCPA is a unitary body of laws governing the procedure and manner 
in which a person may seek relief after a conviction has been entered. Peltier, 119 
Idaho at 456, 808 P.2d at 375. As such, the limitation period set forth in Idaho Code § 
19-4902 controls, whether the petitioner is filing a first petition or a successive petition. 
A court must construe a statute as a whole and consider all sections of the 
applicable statute together to determine the intent of the legislature. Hermann v. Blaine 
County Bd. of Com'rs Acting as Blaine County Bd. of Egualization, 126 Idaho 970, 971, 
895 P.2d 571, 572 (1995) (citing Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., 125 Idaho 333, 336, 
870 P.2d 1292, 1295 (1994)). A construing court's primary duty is to give effect to the 
legislative intent and the policy and purpose underlying a statute. Davaz, 125 Idaho at 
336-37, 870 P.2d at 1295-96. It is incumbent upon the court to give the statute an 
interpretation that will not deprive it of its potency. !!;L_ 
While Idaho Code § 19-4908 permits consideration of a successive application 
for post-conviction relief where the court "finds a ground for relief asserted [in a 
successive application] which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was 
inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application," this 
provision in no way provides an automatic exception to the limitation period set forth in 
I.C. § 19-4902. As an alternative ground, the state sought to have Melton's successive 
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petition summarily dismissed based upon expiration of the UPCPA's one-year statute of 
limitation. (Order Granting Motion to Augment Record with Exhibit 3 - Brief in Support 
of Motion for Summary Dismissal of Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.) 
The district court granted the state's motion for summary dismissal (R., p.103) and 
Melton has not challenged the summary dismissal order on the basis of the statute of 
limitation. 
The state submits Melton's April 18, 2006, successive UPCPA petition was 
untimely from the November 18, 2004, issuance of the remittitur in the appeal of his 
sentence, which marked the start of the "one (1) year from the ... determination of an 
appeal" applicable in his case. I.C. § 19-4902(a). The I.C. § 19-4902(a) one year 
limitation period applies in Melton's case because, as set forth above, he has failed to 
meet the requirements of the relation-back doctrine as set forth by the Idaho Court of 
Appeals in Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 799, 992 P.2d 789, 800 (Ct. App. 1999), 
i.e., that the claims asserted in the successive petition were raised in his first post-
conviction action and "dismissed due to the ineffective assistance of the attorney 
representing [him] in that proceeding." 133 Idaho 794, 799, 992 P.2d 789, 794. 
F. Even If The Merits Of Melton's Successive Petition Claim Could Be Addressed, 
Melton's Bare And Conclusory Claim Did Not Entitle Him To Relief 
Melton alleged ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel for rejecting 
Melton's alleged request that counsel call Melton's daughter C.M., Tammy Blevins, 
Alisa Moon, Ron Gear, and Phillip Brown to provide testimony to.support Melton's claim 
that his daughter's police report was false and that the prosecutor engaged in 
misconduct by instructing C.M. to commit perjury and in keeping other unnamed 
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witnesses from testifying in Melton's behalf. (R., pp.9-10.) In order for Melton to meet 
his burden of establishing a genuine issue of material fact regarding the above claim, 
Melton had the burden of submitting evidence that would be admissible at an 
evidentiary hearing in support of his claim and thereby establishing sufficient reason for 
bringing his successive petition. He failed to do so. 
The district court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory 
allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. 
Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001). An application for post-
conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal if the applicant has not tendered a 
factual showing, based upon evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary 
hearing, to support his claims for relief. Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 534,536,716 P.2d 
1306, 1308 (1986) (citing Drapeau v. State. 103 Idaho 612. 617,651 P.2d 546,551 (Ct. 
App. 1982)); Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822. 824, 702 P.2d 860, 862 (Ct. App. 1985). 
Where petitioner's affidavits are based upon hearsay rather than personal knowledge, 
summary disposition without an evidentiary hearing is appropriate. Ivey v. State, 123 
Idaho 77, 80-81, 844 P.2d 706, 709-10 (1992). When the applicant's evidence fails to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would 
entitle the applicant to the requested relief, summary dismissal is appropriate. I.C. § 19-
4906. 
Melton's contention, that his affidavit in support of his successive petition raised a 
genuine issue of material fact, is without merit. Melton's own statements of what he 
hoped to prove are not based upon personal knowledge as required by I.R.E. 602. 
While Melton's affidavit in support of his successive petition alleged witnesses sent 
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letters to the judge and his trial counsel that they were willing to testify (R., pp.9-10), his 
assertion of what another witness would say is inadmissible hearsay. I.R.E. 801 (c) and 
802. Melton has failed to provide affidavits from his daughter C.M., Tammy Blevins, 
Alisa Moon, Ron Gear, and Phillip Brown as to what each would have specifically 
testified to at the prior evidentiary hearing in support of Melton's perjury and false report 
claim. 
Additionally, Melton's allegation of ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction 
counsel ignores the fact that appointed counsel is not a shill for the petitioner. Because 
Melton alleged he informed his prior post-conviction counsel that Tammy Blevins, 
C.M.'s mother, was willing to testify the prosecutor "told ... [C.M.] to commit perjure 
[sic]" and C.M. was willing to testify the police forced her to file a false report and the 
prosecutor told her to perjure herself (R., p.10), and prior post-conviction counsel 
decided to call only Melton, his sister, and Melton's attorney in the underlying criminal 
case, it must be presumed that prior post-conviction counsel concluded that calling C.M. 
and her mother would have been fruitless. The fact that Melton himself confirmed much 
of the victim's account of the crime suggests that post-conviction counsel did not call the 
alleged witnesses because they would not support the claim of perjury by the victim. 
Melton's factual claims in this case do not establish a prima facie claim to the contrary. 
Furthermore, the two letters purportedly written by C.M. did not support Melton's 
successive petition claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel. (Order 
Granting Motion to Augment Record with Exhibit 5 - Evidence #2.) Plainly, the letter 
addressed generically and dated October 7, 2005, did not exist at the time of the 
January 4, 2005, evidentiary hearing on Melton's first petition. (Order Granting Motion 
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to Augment Record with Exhibit 5 - Evidence #2, p.2.) The other letter, addressed 
"Dear Judge" and discussing alleged coercion by a Health and Welfare employee, is 
undated and unsigned and only confirms that Melton committed an act of lewd conduct 
upon C.M. (Order Granting Motion to Augment Record with Exhibit 5 - Evidence #2, 
p.1.) Specifically, the undated letter indicates Melton molested C.M. "2 or 3 times" and 
"2 times he had all of his closeths [sic] on. And the last time he had his under pants on." 
(Order Granting Motion to Augment Record with Exhibit 5 - Evidence #2, p.1.) The 
letters are further evidence that Melton molested his daughter. See Idaho Criminal Jury 
Instruction 930 ("To constitute a lewd or lascivious act it is not necessary that the bare 
skin be touched. The touching may be through the clothing") (citing State v. 
Greensweig, 102 Idaho 794, 798, 641 P.2d 340, 344 (Ct. App. 1982)). Melton failed to 
show his successive petition claim of perjury and false report was supported by 
documents from C.M. actually in existence at the time he filed his original petition, let 
alone that his prior post-conviction counsel was aware of such. 
Melton failed to meet his burden of showing he had evidence that would be 
admissible to prove every element of his claim and establish that such was lost in 
proceedings on his prior petition due to ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction 
counsel. Rather, Melton's presentence and prior post-conviction admissions rendered 
irrelevant any testimony from C.M. or her mother, or any other witnesses, in support of 
Melton's false report and perjury claim. Prior post-conviction counsel would have been 
justified in determining that calling C.M., Tammy Blevins, Alisa Moon, Ron Gear, and 
Phillip Brown as witnesses at the evidentiary hearing in Melton's prior post-conviction 
case was irrelevant following Melton's admission that his daughter's statement 
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regarding Melton touching her butt with his penis was true (#31626 Tr., p.95, Ls.11-16), 
and that he "rubbed it [his penis] up against her crack of her butt" (#31626 Tr., p.99, 
Ls.16-17). 
G. Summary 
For all of the reasons set forth above, Melton's successive post-conviction 
petition is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, is an untimely disguised motion for a 
new trial, and Melton failed to present "sufficient reason" for proceeding on the merits of 
his successive petition. The state was entitled to summary disposition. 
11. 
The District Court's Error In Not Ruling Upon Motion For Appointment Of Counsel Was 
Harmless In Light Of Melton's Failure To Set Forth Facts Upon Which A Successive 
Petition Claim Of Perjury And False Report Might Be Based 
A. Introduction 
Melton contends the district court erred in not ruling on his motion for 
appointment of counsel prior to dismissing his post-conviction petition. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.17-20.) Given Melton's failure to show sufficient reason for his successive 
petition, the expiration of the UPCPA's statute of limitation, and the fact that the 
underlying merits of his claim were addressed in the prior post-conviction action, there 
was no basis for appointment of counsel in his case. To the extent the district court 
erred in not addressing Melton's request for appointment of counsel prior to ruling on 
the merits of his petition, the error was harmless. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel to represent 
a post-conviction petitioner pursuant to I.C. § 19-4904 is discretionary. Plant v. State, 
143 Idaho 758, 761, 152 P.3d 629, 632 (Ct. App), review denied (2007) (citing 
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); Fox v. State, 
129 Idaho 881, 885, 934 P.2d 947, 951 (Ct. App. 1997)). "In reviewing the denial of a 
motion for appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings, '[!]his Court will not 
set aside the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. As to 
questions of law, this Court exercises free review."' Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 
789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004) (quoting Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676,678, 23 
P.3d 138, 140 (2001)). 
C. Applicable Legal Standards Under I.C. § 19-4904 
Counsel should be appointed if the petitioner qualifies financially and "alleges 
facts showing the possibility of a valid claim that would require further investigation on 
the defendant's behalf." Swaderv. State, 143 Idaho 651,654,152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007); 
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. As Swader instructs: 
When considering a motion for appointment of counsel, the trial court must 
do more than determine whether the petition alleges a valid claim. The 
court must also consider whether circumstances prevent the petitioner 
from making a more thorough investigation into the facts. An indigent 
defendant who is incarcerated in the penitentiary would almost certainly 
be unable to conduct an investigation into facts not already contained in 
the court record. Likewise, a pro se petitioner may be unable to present 
sufficient facts showing that his or her counsel's performance was 
deficient or that such deficiency prejudiced the defense. That showing will 
often require the assistance of someone trained in the law. Therefore, the 
trial court should appoint counsel if the petition alleges facts showing the 
possibility of a valid claim such that a reasonable person with adequate 
means would be willing to retain counsel to conduct a further investigation 
into the claim. The investigation by counsel may not produce evidence 
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sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. But, the decision to appoint 
counsel and the decision on the merits of the petition if counsel is 
appointed are controlled by two different standards. 
143 Idaho at 654-55, 152 P.3d at 15-16. 
Therefore, when a motion for the appointment of counsel is presented, the abuse 
of discretion standard as applied to LC.§ 19-4904, "permits the trial court to determine 
whether the facts alleged are such that they justify the appointment of counsel; and, in 
determining whether to do so, every inference must run in the petitioner's favor where 
the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot be expected to know how to 
properly allege the necessary facts." Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793-94, 102 P.3d at 
1112-13. If, on the other hand, the claims are so patently frivolous that there appears 
no possibility that they could be developed into a viable claim even with the assistance 
of counsel, the court may deny the motion for counsel and proceed with the usual 
procedure for dismissing meritless post-conviction petitions. Workman v. State, 144 
Idaho 518, 529, 164 P.3d 798, 809 (2007); Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491, 493, 95 
P.3d 642, 644 (Ct. App. 2004). 
D. Because Melton Failed To Allege Sufficient Reason For A Successive Petition, 
His Successive Petition Was Time Barred, And Re-litigation Of His Claim Was 
Barred By The Doctrine Of Res Judicata, Any Error Resulting From The District 
Court's Failure To Address Melton's Motion For Appointment Of Counsel Was 
Harmless 
In order to be eligible for appointment of counsel, Melton had to set forth facts 
upon which there might be a possibility of a valid successive post-conviction claim. See 
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. For the reasons set forth above in 
section I, B-G, Melton failed to allege facts to raise the possibility of a valid successive 
post-conviction claim as required to merit appointment of counsel. 
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As noted by the court of appeals in Swisher v. State, 129 Idaho 467, 926 P.2d 
1314 (Ct. App. 1996), if a district court fails to rule on a motion for appointment of 
counsel prior to dismissal of a petition on the merits, an appellate court should 
determine whether the error was harmless because the petition was frivolous. · See 
I.R.C.P. 61 (no error in anything omitted by the court is ground for vacating a judgment 
unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial 
justice). Melton's successive post-conviction petition and supporting affidavit did not 
present any "sufficient reason" for pursuing a successive petition. Also, his perjury and 
false report claim was disproven by C.M.'s letter and Melton's own admissions, and the 
successive petition claim was time barred and barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
Because it was not possible for Melton to establish ineffective assistance of post-
conviction counsel in the prior proceeding, the district court's error in not addressing 
Melton's motion for appointment of counsel prior to dismissing his petition was 
harmless. 
The order of the district court summarily dismissing Melton's successive petition 
for post-conviction petition should be affirmed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
summarily dismissing Melton's untimely successive petition seeking only to re-litigate a 
claim upon which Melton had a prior evidentiary hearing. 
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